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Social Limits to Economic Theory. By Jon Mulberg. New York:
Routledge, 1995. 200 pp. Paper $19.95.
Jon Mulberg writes as a knowledgeable outsider of economic
theory, asking what economic theory can contribute to developing
a new green political economy and a new market socialist
movement. Mulberg's answer, perhaps not surprisingly, is not
much. With the significant exception of the American
Institutionalists, Mulberg finds little of use in economic theory
for his program (traditional Marxist theory is not discussed).
Thus, Mulberg's approach is avowedly left wing and he
writes from a political and sociological perspective. Mulberg
seems to agree with Wesley Mitchell that "Economics has the moral
purpose of obtaining rational control for societal welfare"
(115). Hence, for Mulberg, "defining welfare is of course the
central problem of economics" (ibid) and "without a definition of
value or welfare, it is not possible ... to derive policy
recommendations" (116). From this unusual angle, basically the
search for some kind of operational social utility function which
can effectively guide public policy makers, Mulberg has in effect
written a brief idiosyncratic yet provocative history of economic
thought covering the past hundred years.
The book has 6 chapters. Chapter One, "The Politics of
Positive Economics" deals with methodological issues from a
largely historical perspective. Mulberg concludes that economists
generally subscribe to a positivist methodology. For Mulberg,
the irony is that this methodology aims to provide objective
knowledge of society, and tries to make predictions so that we
can better control our environment. To the extent this succeeds,
it suggests that policy makers can be effective. Yet, this very
success would conflict with the laissez faire attitudes of so
many economists. Throughout the discussion, Mulberg assumes
that it is basically governmental advisers who would use economic
theory to help control the social environment, rather than
private individuals or corporations.
Chapter 2, "From Utility to Welfare: The Trajectory of
Orthodox Economics" is the best in the book. In it, Mulberg
sketches utility theory from Bentham to Jevons, Edgeworth,
Marshall, Pigou, Pareto, Robbins, Hicks, Samuelson, and today's
contemporary welfare economics with its emphasis on the
conditions for Pareto-optimality. Mulberg stresses:
(a) With a cardinal utility of value and diminishing marginal
utility of money one had a strong argument for egalitarian income
distributions; perhaps this induced the shift to an ordinal
theory of utility.
(b) The vacuousness of contemporary welfare economics with
respect to policy evaluation due to the stringency of the
conditions needed to satisfy the requirements for Pareto-
optimality.
Chapter 3, "1930s Market Socialism" is a discussion of the
debates concerning the economic feasibility of market socialism
carried on by Fred Taylor, Barone, Oscar Lange, Mises and Hayek.
The only real heroes in Mulberg's generally depressing story are
in Chapter 4 "American Institutionalism" where he gives brief
sympathetic sketches of the work of Veblen, Mitchell, Ayres and
Commons. Chapter 5, "New Institutionalism" argues that the new
institutionalists are basically complementary to orthodox
microeconomics, "antipathetic" to the original American
institutionalists (131) and largely "apologists for the status
quo" (143) . The final chapter, "New Social Movements" is not so
much a conclusion reviewing the limited value economic theory has
for Mulberg's purposes. Rather, it outlines Mulberg's vision for
a new, greener, more socialistic world and is perhaps the first
draft of an introductory chapter to a new book on the positive
side of a potential socialist green economy .
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